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Abstract
We examine the role of commercial banks in monetary transmission in a factor-
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). A FAVAR exploits a large number of
macroeconomic indicators to identify monetary policy shocks, and we add commonly
used lending aggregates and lending data at the bank level. While our results suggest
that the bank lending channel (BLC) is stronger than previously thought, this feature
is not robust. In addition, our results indicate a di⁄use response to monetary innova-
tions when individual banks are grouped according to asset sizes and loan components.
This suggests that other bank characteristics could improve the identi￿cation of the
BLC.
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Since Bernanke and Blinder￿ s (1992) observation that signi￿cant movements in aggregate
bank lending volume follow changes in the stance of monetary policy, the bank lending
channel (henceforth, BLC) has been a prominent mechanism in the literature on monetary
transmission. The BLC focuses on the balance sheets of commercial banks and assumes that
insured, reservable deposits and other forms of external loan ￿nance (e.g. time deposits, CDs,
etc.) are not perfect substitutes due to the higher costs of acquiring the latter. A monetary
contraction resulting in less reservable deposits should therefore result in a decrease in the
contemporaneous supply of loans.
Building upon the initial intuition for the BLC, the literature has since stressed cross-
sectional di⁄erences among commercial banks￿balance-sheets as well as loan components.
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) considered bank assets and liquidity positions as aggregating
criteria and ￿nd that increases in the Federal funds rate are followed by signi￿cant declines
in lending volume for the smallest (in terms of assets) and least liquid banks.1 Den Haan
et al. (2007) consider loan components aggregated across banks and ￿nd that real estate
and consumer loans sharply decline in response to a monetary contraction while commercial
and industrial (C&I) loans increase.2 While Perez (1998), Ashcraft (2006), and others have
suggested the irrelevance of the BLC in monetary transmission, Kashyap and Stein (1995,
2000) and Den Haan et al. (2007) provide evidence for its existence.
This evidence is not without its limitations. For example, the common use of the Federal
funds rate as the monetary policy instrument may not result in an appropriate identi￿cation
of monetary policy innovations. In addition, aggregating bank lending across either asset
categories or loan components may be contaminating the true responses of individual banks
who are responding to both bank-speci￿c and aggregate sources of ￿ uctuations. It should
1Kishan and Opiela (2000) further ￿nd that banks with the weakest capital positions are the most
responsive to monetary policy.
2The authors suggest that the perverse response of C&I loans could still be consistent with the BLC due
to a bank￿ s preference for the relative safety and term of a C&I loan rather than a longer-term asset (such
as a real estate loan).
2be noted that most contributions to the literature which either supports or refutes the BLC
are in some way subjected to these limitations. The goal of this paper is to empirically put
these limitations to the test.
We examine the lending response of commercial banks in a factor-augmented vector
autoregression (FAVAR). A FAVAR, which combines standard structural VAR methods with
factor analysis, exploits a large number of time series and summarizes the information into a
relatively small set of estimated indexes (i.e. factors). It also has many desirable properties
for an analysis of the BLC. First, utilizing a large data set of macroeconomic variables
like those used by central banks is important when properly identifying monetary policy
innovations. Bernanke et al. (2005) argue that the measurement of policy innovations
is likely to be contaminated by limiting the analysis to a small number of comprehensive
macroeconomic variables.3 Second, one does not need to take a stand on speci￿c observables
(such as industrial production or real GDP) which need to correspond to theoretical concepts
(such as economic activity) because a FAVAR summarizes these concepts using large amounts
of economic information. Finally, a FAVAR provides impulse responses for every variable in
the conditioning set, as well as a decomposition of their individual ￿ uctuations into those
due to aggregate factors and speci￿c innovations.
Our FAVAR framework considers the large set of macroeconomic indicators used by
Bernanke et al. in their identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks, and extends this data
by appending a variety of commercial-bank lending variables. First, total loan growth and
growth in loan components are aggregated up to the total banking system (as in Bernanke
and Blinder, 1992 and Den Haan et al., 2007) as well as up to groups according to asset size
(as in Kashyap and Stein, 1995 and 2000).4 While these variables deliver an indication of how
aggregate bank lending responds to an improved identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks,
3Imperfectly controlling for the information central bankers may have is exactly Sim￿ s (1992) critical
interpretation of an increase in aggregate prices in response to a monetary contraction (i.e. the Price
Puzzle) observed in traditional VAR analyses.
4Following Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), we consider the asset groups to be banks with assets within
the 95th percentile or less (small), banks with assets within the 95th and 99th percentile (medium), and
banks with assets within the 99th percentile or more (large).
3we also consider a large amount of lending data at the individual-bank level. This allows
us to disentangle the ￿ uctuations in bank-level lending data which are due to aggregate
macroeconomic factors (such as a change in monetary policy) from those that are due to
bank-speci￿c conditions. To our knowledge, our analysis is the ￿rst to consider purely
disaggregated lending data within the same framework as their commonly used aggregates
and provides a comparison between the responses of individual and aggregate lending in
response to monetary policy.
Our ￿ndings suggest a stronger BLC than previously thought when examining data ag-
gregated up to the banking sector and asset groups. In particular, we ￿nd that total, C&I,
and individual consumer loan growth all signi￿cantly decline after a monetary policy con-
traction for the entire banking sector as well as bank groups according to asset size. While
this suggests that the BLC e⁄ects more than just the smallest banks, this result weakens
when employing post-1984 data.
Our results also suggest that the individual, bank-level responses to a monetary policy
innovation are quite di⁄use. There are almost as many banks who increase lending as those
who decrease, and this result remains if we control for bank groups and loan components. A
main reason for these varied responses is that macroeconomic ￿ uctuation explain on average
between 8 and 22 percent of the variation in individual bank lending for the banks within
our sample. Therefore, most of the variation in individual bank-lending re￿ ect bank-speci￿c
shocks to which the banks immediately respond. Nonetheless, when considering lending ag-
gregates comprised of only those banks we observe individually, there are signi￿cant declines
for all bank groups in one or more loan components, and these declines remain when em-
ploying post-1984 data.
Our analysis indicates that while particular measures of the BLC are strengthened by
our FAVAR framework, the large degree of heterogeneity observed in the individual-bank
responses cast doubt on the notion that the BLC is stronger for banks based on asset size or
loan components. This does not imply that other banking characteristics might prove more
4suitable to di⁄erentiate banks which have a di⁄erent BLC e⁄ect. For example, Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2009) show that the degree of globalization of a commercial bank could matter for
the BLC because globalized banks can activate foreign capital markets to insulate themselves
from domestic liquidity conditions. Evidence of this type will prove useful to target the
important features of intermediation in monetary transmission and provide theorists with a
set of crucial features of banking to incorporate into their environments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the formulation and
estimation of the FAVAR. Section 3 discusses the data sets used. Section 4 presents our
empirical results by ￿rst detailing the impulse responses of loan aggregates to a monetary
policy shock, and then examining the characteristics of disaggregated loan data. Section 5
concludes.
2. The FAVAR
Our implementation of the FAVAR follows Bernanke et al. (2005). A general description
of the framework is as follows. Assume the economy is a⁄ected by a vector Ct of common
components which a⁄ect all variables in the data set. For example, we assume that a measure
of the stance of monetary policy is considered to be a common component, and we follow
the literature and assume that this stance is measured by the Federal funds rate (Rt). The
remaining shared dynamics of each data series are captured by a K ￿1 vector of unobserved
factors Ft, where K is relatively small. These unobserved factors capture ￿ uctuations in
general economic concepts such as economic activity, aggregate prices, credit conditions, etc.,
that cannot be easily represented by a few time series but rather are re￿ ected in a wide range
of economic variables.
We assume that the joint dynamics of Ft and Rt are given by
Ct = ￿(L)Ct￿1 + ￿t (1)
5where C0
t = [F 0
t Rt] and ￿(L) is a conformable lag polynomial of in￿nite order which may
contain a priori restrictions as in the structural VAR literature. The error term ￿t is i.i.d.
with zero mean and covariance matrix Q.
While (1) is a VAR in Ct, it cannot be directly estimated because the factors comprising Ft
are unobserved. However, since these factors are interpreted as representing forces a⁄ecting
many economic variables, one can potentially use a large set of observed ￿informational￿
series to infer something about them. Let Xt denote the N ￿1 vector of these informational
variables, where N is relatively large. It is assumed that the Xt is related to all common
components according to
Xt = ￿Ct + et (2)
where ￿ is an N ￿(K + 1) matrix of factor loadings. The N ￿1 vector et contains the zero-
mean, series-speci￿c components that are uncorrelated with Ct, but allowed to be serially
correlated and weakly correlated across indicators. Equation (2) re￿ ects that Ct represents
pervasive forces which drive the common dynamics of Xt. Conditional on Rt, the Xt are
thus noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors Ft. Bernanke et al. note that the
implication of Xt depending only on current factors is not restrictive in practice, as Ft can
be interpreted as including arbitrary lags of the fundamental factors.
Estimation of the above model involves a two-step principal component approach. In
the ￿rst step, principal components are extracted from Xt to obtain consistent estimates of
the common factors. In the second step, the Federal funds rate is added to the estimated
common factors and the data set is used to estimate (1). In particular, estimation of our
model follows Boivin et al. (2009), who slightly di⁄er from the estimation described by
Bernanke et al. insofar that it is assumed that Rt is one of the factors in the ￿rst-step. This
guarantees that the latent factors recover common dynamics not captured by the Federal
funds rate.5
5See Boivin et al. (2009) for details.
63. The Data
Our data set is a balanced panel of 1512 quarterly series from 1976:1 to 2005:3. The ￿rst
111 series are macroeconomic indicators originally considered in the initial FAVAR analysis of
Bernanke et al., and also used by Boivin et al. (see appendix for details).6 Included in these
series are several measures of industrial production, price indices, interest rates, employment
as well as other key macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables, which have been found to contain
information useful to capture the state of the economy and identify monetary policy.
The remainder of our data set includes several variables constructed using loan infor-
mation for individual commercial banks taken from the Consolidated Report of Condition
and Income (Call Reports) that all insured banks submit to the Federal Reserve. For each
commercial bank, data on total loans, total C&I, total real estate loans, and individual loans
were collected following the detailed instructions on forming consistent time series attribut-
able to Kashyap and Stein (2000). For each quarter, we used total asset holdings of the
commercial banks to assign each bank into one of three possible size categories: banks with
total assets below the 95th percentile (small banks), banks with total assets between the 95th
and 99th percentile (medium banks), and banks with total assets above the 99th percentile
(large banks). To retain comparability with previous studies of the BLC, we use these asset
categories to construct a disaggregation of the commercial banking data. In particular, we
use the lending data to construct loan growths for all bank components aggregated up to
the entire sector as well as the three asset groups. However, since the FAVAR framework
can handle large amounts of data, we also keep individual banks separate and use the asset
size categories to determine if there are any common movements in banks that di⁄er across
this characteristic.
In order to arrive at a manageable data set for our FAVAR analysis, we had to apply sev-
eral ￿lters on the individual bank-level data. In particular, our balanced panel of commercial
banks initially consisted of 4743 individual banks. Of these, 219 banks were removed because
6We are grateful to Marc Giannoni for providing us with this data.
7their bank size was not consistent throughout the sample. The resulting data set consisted of
18 large banks, 24 medium banks, and 4482 small banks. Since the small banks are still too
numerous, the data set we settled on to estimate the FAVAR consists of a random selection
of 10 percent of the small bank population.7 We then used these banks to construct time
series for their loan growths in the exact same way as in the loan aggregates. In addition,
in order to directly compare the individual bank responses with some aggregate measure of
their response, we also constructed loan aggregates similar to those above for all banks but
only using the banks we observe in our bank-level data set.
4. Estimation Results
We estimate the above system (1) and (2) for four di⁄erent FAVARs which di⁄er in the
type of bank lending (total, C&I, real estate, and individual). For each FAVAR, the data set
Xt consisted of the macroeconomic indicators as well as the aggregate and bank-level lending
data for each particular loan category. We chose the size of factors Ft for each FAVAR after
some experimentation to ensure that our conclusions are not a⁄ected by additional latent
factors.8 All models use 4 quarterly lags in estimating (1).
The ￿rst subsection focuses on the response of aggregated lending data to a monetary
policy shock, while the second subsection focuses on the characteristics and behavior of the
disaggregated lending data.
4.1. Aggregated Lending
Following Bernanke et al. and Boivin et al., we assume that the Federal funds rate may
respond to contemporaneous ￿ uctuations in estimated factors, but that none of the latent
common components can contemporaneously respond to monetary policy shocks. This is
7The estimation was conducted for several di⁄erent samples of small banks to ensure robustness of the
results.
8Our FAVARs for Total and Real Estate loans required 5 latent factors, while C&I and Industrial loans
required 4.
8the FAVAR extension of the standard recursive identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks in
conventional VARs, which has been used for instance by Den Haan (2007). Note that in
contrast to VARs, the macroeconomic indicators (Xt) are allowed to contemporaneously
respond to monetary shocks. We can therefore disentangle monetary policy shocks from the
other macroeconomic shocks.
The responses of our lending aggregates to an unexpected (25 basis point) increase of
the Federal Funds rate are illustrated in Figure 1. Each panel illustrates the response of a
particular loan component for loans aggregated across all banks as well as the three asset
groups. A diamond indicates that the impulse response at that particular time horizon
is signi￿cantly di⁄erent than zero at the 90 percent level. As the ￿gure indicates, there
are signi￿cant and persistent declines in Total, C&I, and Individual loans in response to a
monetary policy shock for all bank groups (including the total). This result suggests that
the BLC is actually stronger than previously reported under this identi￿cation of monetary
policy. Previous analyses only ￿nd a signi￿cant BLC in either the smallest (asset-wise) or
least liquid banks. Only aggregate real estate lending illustrates a BLC for the smallest
banks exclusively.
Our result of a stronger BLC, however, is not a consistent feature of the data. Due to
the evidence of widespread instability in many macroeconomic series, a change in monetary
policy, and a decline in overall macroeconomic volatility around 1984, we re-estimated our
FAVARs using post-1984 data. Figure 2 illustrates a large reduction in the signi￿cance of the
impulse responses. In fact, some loan components actually increase (albeit, insigni￿cantly)
after a monetary contraction. The only loan component which retains a signi￿cant BLC is
Individual loans, which accords with the results of Den Haan (2007) who ￿nd the largest
BLC e⁄ect in aggregate consumer loans.9
9It should be noted that our results for real estate loans also mimic the results of Den Haan (2007), but
fail to be signi￿cant.
94.2. Disaggregated Lending
This section turns to an analysis of the bank-speci￿c lending data which was used along




iCt + eit; (3)
where xit is the quarterly change in loan growth for bank i. The ￿ uctuations for all banks
due to the macroeconomic factors are represented by the the common components Ct which
have a di⁄use e⁄ect on the individual banks due to di⁄erences in ￿i, while the bank-speci￿c
￿ uctuations are captured by eit.
We detail some summary statistics on the average volatility of loan components and their
corresponding aggregates in Table 1. It should be noted that the corresponding aggregates
are not the aggregates discussed in the previous section, but the aggregation of banks that
appear in our bank-level data set. This comparison serves to illustrate potential aggregation
e⁄ects among the individual banks.
The ￿rst column of Table 1 suggests a large amount of average volatility in our bank-
level lending data. This volatility is decomposed into volatility stemming from common
macroeconomic and speci￿c factors, and the R2 statistic measures the fraction of the variance
in aggregate lending explained by the common components. The results suggest that loan
￿ uctuations stemming from aggregate or common shocks make up a very small amount of
the average volatility in our lending data. For example, when considering banks with assets
less than the 95th percentile, bank-speci￿c shocks account on average for 76 percent of
their ￿ uctuations in total lending and as much as 92 percent of their ￿ uctuations in lending
components. When comparing these volatilities with their corresponding aggregates, one
￿nds a large reduction in volatility due to a large reduction in the bank-speci￿c component.
The R2 statistics now state that 75 percent or more of the ￿ uctuations in these variables
are attributable to ￿ uctuations in macroeconomic components. While this comparison is the
10most stark for the smallest bank group, similar comparisons for all bank groups and all loan
components report a reduction in volatility due to aggregating the bank-level data as well
as an increased R2. Quite naturally, these results suggests that disturbances arising at the
individual bank level tend to cancel each other out when aggregating.
Returning focus to the bank-level data, Figure 3 illustrates a strongly positive correlation
between the macroeconomic and bank-speci￿c components of lending volatility. While the
￿gure considers all banks, this positive relationship between the volatility of the idiosyncratic
shocks (Sd(ei)) and the volatility of the common component (Sd(￿
0
iCt)) would remain if we
considered banks groups separately. Among the loan components, the tightest relationships
are among C&I and Real Estate loans, with a weaker relationship among Individual loans
and the total. All slope coe¢ cients are statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 95 percent
level, and are corrected for possible heteroscedasticity.10 From this perspective, banks with
the highest idiosyncratic volatility also respond the strongest to macroeconomic shocks.
Therefore, whatever characteristics which help banks smooth over individual shocks will
also help smooth over macroeconomic shocks.
Our ￿nal analysis of the bank-level data is to document how loan growth responds to
bank-speci￿c and macroeconomic disturbances. These impulse responses are illustrated in
Figures 4 through 6 for large, medium, and small banks, respectively. The left panels of
the ￿gures report the response of each of the individual banks to an adverse (one standard
deviation) shock to its bank-speci￿c component. The solid lines represent an unweighted
average response. Across all bank groups and loan components, lending responds sharply
and promptly to bank-speci￿c disturbances. There is very little persistence in the response
of all banks, and they quickly reach a new equilibrium.
While bank-speci￿c shocks rapidly shift the loan growth of individual banks to a new
level, the macroeconomic shocks are quite di⁄erent. The middle panels of the ￿gures illus-
trate the response of each bank group and loan component to an innovation (of minus one
10The respective t statistics for the slope coe¢ cients are 10.5, 22.9, 26.7, and 12.4.
11standard deviation) to its common component ￿
0
iCt. These ￿gures suggest a large amount of
sluggishness in the response to macroeconomic disturbances, and this persistence is shared
by all bank groups and all loan components. In particular, the ￿gures illustrate that all
banks behave quite similarly to a common macroeconomic shock. While this exercise fails
to identify a speci￿c structural macroeconomic shock and instead illustrates the response to
a combination of macroeconomic shocks, the response to these shocks strongly contrast with
the responses to bank-speci￿c shocks.
We ￿nally turn to the e⁄ects of monetary policy on our bank lending panel. The identi-
￿cation of monetary policy shocks is accomplished in the same way as the previous section
focusing on the aggregated lending data, and the results are illustrated in the third columns
of Figures 4 through 6 for our three bank groups. The thick solid lines again represent an
unweighted average response, while the thick dashed lines illustrate the response of the cor-
responding aggregated data mentioned in the discussion of Table 1. A circle indicates that
the impulse response at that particular time horizon for the aggregated data is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent than zero at the 90 percent level. Similar to the responses illustrated in Figures 1
and 2, there is a fair amount of signi￿cance in the aggregated data for all bank groups. The
most signi￿cant declines appear to be coming from C&I and Real Estate loan components,
with only a few signi￿cant periods of decline for Individual loans exclusively from the small
bank group. It should be kept in mind that these aggregates are not over the entire banking
sector, but for the banks that made it into our bank-level panel. These banks have their own
individual response to the same monetary policy shock, and are illustrated in the ￿gures
by the thin dotted lines. A striking feature of these bank-speci￿c responses is that there
is a large amount of heterogeneity among banks of similar asset size, with almost as many
banks increasing their lending in response to a surprise monetary contraction as there are
banks decreasing their lending. This is a robust feature of the data across bank size and loan
components, and suggests a rather stark discrepancy between an individual bank response
and the aggregate of which it is a member.
124.3. Robustness Results
4.3.1. Disaggregated Lending, Post-1984
Similar to the aggregate lending results, the disaggregated bank-level data was also re-
estimated using post-1984 data. In contrast to the loan aggregates, the disaggregated-loan
results tell a similar story to the results under the full sample. As illustrated in Table 2,
we ￿nd much less volatility in the aggregated time series relative to the average volatility
of the bank-level panel, as well as a much larger percentage of the aggregate ￿ uctuations
being attributable to ￿ uctuations in macroeconomic components. More importantly, our
impulse response analysis under post-1984 data retains much of the signi￿cance of the BLC
illustrated under the full sample. These are illustrated in Figures 7-9. Again, it should be
noted that these aggregates are constructed using only the individual banks in our panel and
therefore is not a complete picture of aggregate lending.
4.3.2. Alternative Factor Estimations
In order to verify that the number of factors in our FAVARs were reasonable, we per-
formed robustness checks as in Bernanke et al. by re-estimating the FAVARs with an in-
creased number of factors. The impulse responses for bank speci￿c, common component and
monetary policy shocks did not qualitatively change from the main results discussed above
for total, C&I, or Real Estate loans. The only minor change in impulse responses was for
individual loans, which displayed a slightly positive response to a contractionary monetary
shock for aggregated large banks. In terms of the disaggregated data, increasing the number
of factors did not qualitatively change the results reported in Table 1, in particular, the R2
calculations measuring the amount of ￿ uctuation in individual bank lending attributable to
macroeconomic shocks.
135. Conclusion
This paper examined the role of commercial banks in monetary transmission in a factor-
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). The ability of a FAVAR to exploit a large con-
ditioning set of macroeconomic indicators when identifying monetary policy shocks, coupled
with the ability to calculate impulse responses for every variable in this set, allows us to assess
the bank lending channel of monetary policy using commonly considered lending aggregates
and a panel of individual lending data.
Our analysis delivers two results. First, our results suggest that the BLC is stronger than
previously thought for loan aggregates and particular loan components. In particular, we ￿nd
a signi￿cant BLC for more bank groups than the smallest banks (asset-wise) as well as for
Total, C&I, and Individual loans. While this result suggests that an improved identi￿cation
of monetary policy shocks uncovers a profound BLC, it is not robust when employing post-
1984 data. Second, the bank-level data show a di⁄use response to monetary innovations. We
￿nd that almost as many commercial banks increase their lending in response to a monetary
contraction as there are banks that decrease. This result is unchanged when considering
di⁄erent loan components as well as banks grouped according to asset size. However, the
responses of loan aggregates using only the banks in our balanced panel still show a stronger
BLC than previously thought, and this result is robust to employing post-1984 data.
We believe that these results deliver two conclusions. First, the improved identi￿cation
of monetary policy shocks stemming from a FAVAR analysis is a useful tool for uncovering
the BLC and potentially many more monetary matters. Second, the large degree of hetero-
geneity among commercial banks of similar asset size as well as loan components suggests
that these might not be the best characteristics for di⁄erentiating whether or not a bank is
susceptible to the BLC. Some alternative characteristics (such as the level of global oper-
ations, geographic characteristics, etc.) are presently being proposed in the literature, and
it would be interesting to see if the individual lending responses from our FAVAR would
behave similarly when banks share these similar characteristics. Uncovering these impor-
14tant characteristics of banking can uncover their role in monetary transmission, and provide
theorists with a set of crucial features of banking to incorporate into their environments.
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16Appendices
6. Data Appendix
Our data set consists of 111 macroeconomic indicators, a series of loan aggregates, and
a series of lending at the individual bank level. The macroeconomic indicators are the same
as those used by Bernanke et al. and Boivin et al., and we refer to the data appendix of
Bernanke et al. (2005) pages 416-420.
Our lending data was constructed following Notes on Forming Consistent Time Series
written by Anil Kashyap and Jeremy Stein and is available at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago website.11
7. Tables and Figures
11http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm
17Table 1: Volatility and Persistence of Bank Lending
Disaggregates Aggregates
xit Common Speci￿c R2 xit Common Speci￿c R2
Total Loans All 5.82 2.54 5.23 0.22 5.47 2.51 4.86 0.21
Large 9.04 2.64 8.63 0.10 6.03 2.69 5.39 0.20
Medium 6.01 2.09 5.58 0.16 2.10 1.42 1.55 0.46
Small 5.67 2.56 4.95 0.24 1.30 1.23 0.43 0.89
C&I Loans All 18.38 4.69 17.68 0.08 6.97 3.20 6.19 0.21
Large 10.30 3.19 9.71 0.12 7.38 3.34 6.58 0.20
Medium 9.90 3.18 9.28 0.14 2.99 2.02 2.21 0.46
Small 19.20 4.84 18.50 0.08 2.13 1.84 1.07 0.75
Real Estate All 9.06 2.82 8.54 0.13 3.78 2.33 2.97 0.38
Large 10.66 3.14 10.14 0.10 4.24 2.59 3.35 0.37
Medium 7.56 2.44 7.13 0.12 1.99 1.16 1.61 0.34
Small 9.07 2.82 8.55 0.13 1.23 1.09 0.58 0.78
Individual All 11.79 3.73 11.02 0.13 4.30 1.31 4.09 0.09
Large 14.80 3.32 14.33 0.08 4.88 1.35 4.69 0.08
Medium 9.04 2.91 8.48 0.15 2.91 2.00 2.11 0.47
Small 11.82 3.78 11.03 0.13 1.94 1.86 0.55 0.92































Figure 1: Impulse responses of lending aggregates (in %) to an identi￿ed monetary policy
shock. The monetary shock is a surprise of 25 basis points in the Federal funds rate. The
label Total stands for each loan component aggregated across all banks, while sizes stand for
aggregates according to asset size. A diamond indicates a signi￿cant distance from zero at
the 90 percent con￿dence level.


































Figure 2: Post-1984: Impulse responses of lending aggregates (in %) to an identi￿ed monetary
policy shock. The monetary shock is a surprise of 25 basis points in the Federal funds rate.
The label Total stands for each loan component aggregated across all banks, while sizes
stand for aggregates according to asset size. A diamond indicates a signi￿cant distance from
zero at the 90 percent con￿dence level.













































































Figure 3: Standard deviation (in %) of bank-speci￿c and macroeconomic (common) compo-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 2: Volatility of Bank Lending, Post-1984
Disaggregates Aggregates
xit Common Speci￿c R2 xit Common Speci￿c R2
Total Loans All 5.73 2.28 5.13 0.19 3.37 1.79 2.85 0.28
Large 9.32 2.52 8.93 0.08 3.55 1.84 3.03 0.27
Medium 5.75 1.90 5.40 0.12 2.18 1.49 1.59 0.47
Small 5.58 2.29 4.96 0.20 1.10 1.02 0.43 0.84
C&I Loans All 17.53 5.06 16.68 0.10 3.98 2.15 3.35 0.29
Large 10.31 3.34 9.66 0.14 4.14 2.18 3.52 0.28
Medium 9.76 3.50 9.02 0.15 3.03 2.11 2.18 0.48
Small 18.28 5.22 17.41 0.09 2.09 1.66 1.26 0.63
Real Estate All 8.30 2.33 7.90 0.11 3.91 2.20 3.23 0.32
Large 11.54 2.97 11.10 0.08 4.28 2.38 3.56 0.31
Medium 7.24 1.90 6.95 0.09 2.00 1.08 1.68 0.29
Small 8.23 2.33 7.82 0.11 0.96 0.63 0.73 0.43
Individual All 11.65 3.68 10.85 0.13 4.01 1.02 3.87 0.07
Large 16.02 3.71 15.48 0.07 4.35 1.02 4.23 0.05
Medium 9.39 2.64 8.94 0.12 2.73 1.36 2.37 0.25
Small 11.60 3.73 10.78 0.13 1.56 1.38 0.72 0.78
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